It has been taken for granted that a very unique Macao identity has been evolving after more than 450 years of Portuguese rule and cultural influence. 
Introduction
In the 1990s Taiwan's democratization and the transition of sovereignty in both Hong Kong and Macao raised the scholarly awareness of these smaller entities of the so-called Greater China region. Of particular interest were the unique indigenous  Correspondence concerning this article may be addressed to the author at: mkaeding@sino.uni-heidelberg.de 2 identities that had developed in this region and which were fundamentally different from the Mainland Chinese identity propagated by the People's Republic of China (PRC). In 1999 Macao became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the PRC. A key question raised in many publications was concerned about the survival of the unique melange of centuries of Portuguese and Chinese interactions after the sovereignty transfer. The territory's particular identity has been described as a cultural identity focusing on its Portuguese chromosome (Flores, 2003) , cultural syncretism (Ngai, 1999; Cheng, 2002) , and the anthropology of the Macanese -people of mixed Portuguese-Chinese and Portuguese-Malayan ancestry (de Pina Cabral & Lourenço, 1993; Amaro, 1994; Zhou & Li, 2007) . A decade after the sovereignty and administrative transfer of Macao, it is perhaps the ripe time to study the question of what constitutes the Macao identity and how it has developed since 1999. Can other elements apart from cultural ones be found in Macao's identity? Does this unique identity pose a similar question to the Taiwanese? This paper studies the identity of the Macao people along the lines of an ethno-cultural versus a civic identification. Research on the cultural identity of Macao and its political culture and participation will be analysed. My central argument is that the peoples' identification with Macao is primarily ethno-culturally defined. Basic elements of a civic identity exist in the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR) and there are signs that this part of identity is slowly developing. For the time being the Macao identity is considerably weaker than that of Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Cultural identification with Mainland China is high, but the core reason lies in its relatively weak civic identity. The future development of Macao's civic identity will depend on the political participation of citizens and on the levels of immigration and integration with the Mainland. The theoretical framework of this paper is provided by a set of theories on national identity construction. A thorough examination of the ethno-cultural and civic realm in Macao identifies population structure, material culture, language, education, politico-legal structure and participation patterns as the core elements of identity. These factors, however, simultaneously are limiting the development of Macao's identity. These findings will be illustrated with the results of quantitative studies on citizens' identification after 1999. My pilot study on identity among 59 students at the University of Macao in mid-October 2009 raises important questions on the cultural and political identifications with Macao and China. 5 conflict over the illegal construction of a pro-Communist school on Taipa Island led to anti-colonial demonstrations and riots (Edmonds, 1992, p. 7) . Local police and army forces struggled to suppress the uprisings. The Chinese population suffered casualties and the colonial government lost credibility among the Chinese population and the effective rule over the city. The government was forced to issue an official apology to the PRC government, pay compensations and agree on a secret deal promising local cooperation with Beijing in exchange for continued Portuguese rule (Chan, 2003, p. 498) . Moreover, all organizations close to the Chinese Nationalist Party were banned.
The pro-Communist or so-called patriotic social groups took over many services from the government, establishing wide control over the population. The colonial administration's retreat from the daily life culminated in 1976, when the Portuguese government offered to return Macao to the PRC. It was turned down and instead the status of the city was changed into being a Chinese territory under Portuguese administration. Democratization began in the mid-1970s with the establishment of the direct elections of the Legislative Assembly (Yee, 1999, p. 29 
The Emergence of a Macao Identity
Discussing and defining a distinctive Macao identity was for a long time a taboo in the territory. This resulted in a weak sense of belonging among the population, which was further aggravated by the massive influx of immigrants since the opening up of Mainland China in 1978 (Ngai, 1999, p. 112) . This immigration wave, however, together with the rapid increase in standards of living in the 1980s, weakened the neighbourhood communities and created a new middle class with a generalized Macao identity (de Pina-Cabral, 2002, p. 44) . In the 1990s, a clear demarcation line emerged between the "Macao people" or "Macao Chinese" (Aomen ren), who would also describe themselves with the term "local person" (bendiren), and other Chinese groups like new immigrants and overseas Chinese (huaren) (Berlie, 1999, p. 21) . The length of residence in Macao is an important marker of distinction (Yee, 2002, p. 38) as well as the adaptation to a certain way of life and customs. The "local person" category is inclusive and incorporates the ethnically mixed Macanese. Its defining feature is not so much whether one was born in the city, but having undergone basic schooling in Macao. The identity contains a strong economic notion and is closely related to being a member of the middle class. In cultural terms these "local persons" are accustomed to the freedom of religion and expression and a level of cosmopolitism. But the main marker is the ability to speak Cantonese in the way that it is spoken by the middle class of the city. Many "Macao people" have foreign passports and are Portuguese citizens from birth, but still consider themselves as Chinese and feel close to China in a historic sense (de Pina-Cabral, 2002, p. 44 ).
Therefore they often opt for the identity category of "Macao people" despite their Portuguese passport.
Macao's Culture
Macao is a dominantly Chinese city, 2 with most residents born in Mainland China 7 (47.1 per cent) and a majority resided in the city of Macao for less than five years (27.3 per cent) (Statistics and Census Service, 2007) . The Portuguese presence in the territory decreased visibly after the handover. Many Portuguese residents were government officials or employed in the administration on a few years' contractual bases and left after 1999 (Edmonds & Yee, 1999, p. 805 (Amaro, 1988, pp. 4-7; 1994, p. 218) . Some Macanese are part of long established families in the territory who are descendents of inter-racial marriages between
Portuguese and indigenous women from other former Portuguese colonies or trade posts in Africa, South and Southeast Asia and Japan. Others originate from more recent pairings of Portuguese and Chinese individuals (Cheng, 1999, p. 8; Watts, 1998, p. 287 architecture, and enjoyed a higher social status than local Chinese residents (Yee, 2001, p. 132) .
and Census Service, 2008).
3 The Portuguese term "Macaense" describes the Portuguese-based community of Macao and is the origin for the English term "Macanese." The local born decedents of mixed marriages are called "Filhos da terra" (sons of the earth) and in Chinese, turen (local person), and more recently, tushengren (local-born person) or tushengzai (local-born boy) (Berlie, 1999, p. 23 ).
4 For alternative definitions of the term Macanese, see also Teixeira (1965) (Ngai, 1999, p. 116) . Although
Macao is a city shaped by Chinese culture, the Latin cultural elements make it different (Ngai, 1998, p. 308) . The impact of these Portuguese aspects on Macao's society can be observed in the territory's material culture. The city's urban space was designed like a Portuguese town (Flores, 2003, p. 40) (Chung, 2009, p. 137) . This syncretism and amalgamation, which can be observed not only in furniture design (Duan, 1997, p. 156) and architecture but also in some aspects of religious practices, highlighting the fact that the Catholic Church officially concedes to include the Chinese "theistic cult" of ancestor worship (Cheng, 1999, p. 7). Religious tolerance and harmony are the key features of Macao's cultural identity (Ngai, 1999, p. 119) , with Catholic and Buddhist dignitaries both present at important events pointing towards a balance of power relations and a subtle religious compromise (Ngai, 1999, p. 119; Cheng, 2002, p. 211 ).
Cultural hybridization is most evident in the two cultural areas of language and cuisine related to the Macanese ethnic group: the Portuguese creole dialect Patois and Macanese food. Patois is a mixture of Chinese syntax with Portuguese and Malay vocabularies and was once widely used among some parts of the Macanese population.
It disappeared with the teaching of Portuguese and Chinese languages in schools since 9 the mid-nineteenth century (Cheng, 2002, p. 205 Malay, African and Chinese practices developed into an "indigenous" culinary culture (Cheng, 1999, p. 9) . The reproduced cultural practice and values in turn provide the Macanese community with a means of self-definition, adding their restaurants as an assertion of a unique identity (Cheng, 2002, p. 204; Augustin-Jean, 1999, p. 117) . In daily life these cases of hybridization and syncretism in Macao's culture are however rare and in general the Portuguese and Chinese cultures have retained their own identity and specificities within the space of the territory (Cheng, 2002, p. 217 ). The coexistence, interaction and partly blending of cultures based on mutual respect and tolerance, harmony instead of conflict, and stability in plurality are the key components of the "Macao model" (Ngai, 1999, p. 120) . Political scientist Herbert
Yee argues that for the common Chinese residents of Macao, the relevance of this identity remains low. 7 Journalist José Carlos Matias calls it the "projected Macao identity" created by the Macanese community. 8 Yee sees the Macao identity more as a sense of belonging to the own neighbourhood, to the "small town feeling," with a slower pace and local restaurants that is still alive in the older parts of the city 9 . The idea of true multi-culturalism has not gained ground largely due to inadequate teaching of the city's multi-cultural tradition (Rocha, 2002, p. 110) .
Portuguese Influence and Education
The Portuguese influence on the city's collective identity in general is largely Control over the education sector is used by governments to shape citizens identity.
Yet the Macao colonial government's role in social affairs and education was very limited and its primarily concern is with the education of the Portuguese children, neglecting the Chinese inhabitants (Tse, 2005, 181) .
To a large extent the "laissez faire" attitude can be attributed to the ownership structure of the schools. (Tse, 2001, p. 309) . The post-handover curriculum followed suit, "characterised by a shallow and confused presentation of multicultural education," Confucian traditional virtues and patriotism (Tse, 2005, pp. 190-192) . The lack of a unified school curriculum, the focus of civic education on moral ideas and the absences of unified history textbooks focusing exclusively on Macao's history have all severely limited the formation of a local identity. 11 Nevertheless, some teachers and schools have made considerable individual efforts to create a textbook 12 on Macao's history underlining the interest and importance of the subject. 13 The failures of the Macao governments to install liberal values, multi-culturalism and strong identification with the city and its
Portuguese heritage have created "mono-cultural citizens" (Rocha, 2002, p. 110 ).
This contrasts with the official government position valuating Portuguese heritage and language as a part of the territory's distinct identity, utilized in promoting connections with the Portuguese-speaking world (Bray & Koo, 2005, p. 157) .
Furthermore the status of Portuguese as an official language is guaranteed for 50 years by the Basic Law and the government's language policy after the handover aims at triliteracy (i.e. written Chinese, Portuguese and English) and quadrilingual (i.e.
spoken Cantonese, Putonghua, Portuguese and English) (Bray & Koo, 2005, p. 152 ).
However in daily practice the Chinese and Portuguese linguistic universes are strictly divided with their own media (press, television and radio) and Portuguese and
Chinese medium schools (de Pinal-Cabral, 2002, p. 32) . The large majority of the population speaks Chinese (95.6 per cent), and only 0.6 per cent speaks Portuguese (Statistics and Census Service, 2007) . Until 1993 Portuguese was the only official language and the exclusive idiom in the legal system and administration. Yet very few
Chinese intellectuals speak Portuguese and the Macao people were never forced to adopt the language of the colonizers like it was the case in other Portuguese overseas possessions or practised by other colonizing powers (Berlie, 2002, p. 73) . Although the colonial government aimed at expanding the role of Portuguese language in schools during the early 1990s, these efforts were rebuffed by the private operators of the schools (Bray & Koo, 2005, p. 152) . Ratna Ghosh's study on the identity of 12 A good example is the textbook created by the Pui Ching School.
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Macao's youth reveals that the direct influence of Portuguese language and culture is limited to schools and related social activities. The respondents express less positive characteristics like laziness, and being playful to the Portuguese. Speaking the Portuguese language means to be identified as Portuguese and thus it would have a negative influence on their identity (Ghosh, 2002, p. 149) . Together with the relative lower practical commercial value and significance as an international communication medium of Portuguese vis-à-vis Chinese or English (Lo, 2008, p. 9) , the language of the colonizer has never become part of the people's unique Macao identity and a means to differentiate from the Mainland Chinese. The small impact of the Portuguese on the identity of the Chinese Macao residents does also have economic reasons.
Macao was always heavily dependent on the Chinese Mainland and especially Hong
Kong. The neighbouring former British colony is an important reference point for the Macao people, who readily consume Hong Kong's (popular) culture products (Ghosh, 2002, p. 154) . The cultural influence of the territory reaches a level at which many
Macao people would rather identify themselves as Hong Kong persons than
Portuguese (Zhou, 2003, pp. 126-127 ).
Macao's Identity Politics in Comparison
The limited control of the administration over the education sector, and in particular over the curricula, does severely circumcise the governments ability to shape the identity of Macao citizens. The cases of Taiwan and Hong Kong show that curriculum reform is at the heart of governments' identity politics. In Taiwan, the KMT had for decades promoted a pan-Chinese nationalism in all areas of society, before the government embarked on a path of Taiwanization, strengthening the Taiwan identity since the early 1990s. President Lee Teng-hui introduced political changes that began democratization and Taiwanization in the political and cultural area. An important step in Taiwanization was taken in 1997, with the new junior high school curriculum which focused on the distinctive nature of Taiwan history, geography and society and gave "an impulse to the notion of pluralistic national identity and national identification" (Corcuff, 2002, p. 160) . In 2000, DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian won the presidential elections, campaigning on the strength of his ethnic background as a
Taiwanese. The rapid and forceful Taiwanization under Chen Shui-bian could be 13 described as a process of De-Sinicization, as cultural and symbolic ties to China and Chinese nationalism of the authoritarian era were cut and replaced by Taiwan centrism (Chang, 2004, p. 44) . The Hong Kong government launched immediately after the handover several programmes, initiated policies and introduced changes which were all aimed at an active change in the creation of a unified Chinese identity.
The measures in the educational realm included, for example, changes in the school curriculum. The PRC began to be portrayed in much more favourable light, focusing on economic achievements and rising international status, and excluding events like the Tiananmen massacre (Vickers & Kan, 2003) . The most controversial measure, however, was the introduction of mother-tongue teaching at secondary schools.
14 English is seen as a form of cultural and symbolic capital that distinguishes Hong
Kong from the Mainland and thus the policy was taken as an attempt to alter the collective identity (Chan, 2002, 283) . The government further strengthened the subject civic education in schools (Vickers & Kan 2003) and the national song and national flag featured prominently at educational institutions.
The Macao government is much less directly involved in initiatives promoting
Chinese identity and identity politics compared to the governments in Hong Kong and
Taiwan. The various "patriotic" organizations in the territory have been creating a pro-CCP atmosphere for decades and the schools under their control cultivate patriotism to the Beijing regime's liking. Nevertheless, the administration fosters identification with the PRC and as Chinese citizens through festivals and activities on national holidays.
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Civic Identity
The emergence of a distinctive identity based on the civic realm of national identity is connected to unique political and legal structures, a fixed distinct territory and political culture. Although Macao's territory in exact terms was never agreed upon by 14 (Breitung, 2004, pp. 10-11) . With the opening up of China in the late 1970s, the rate of border crossing rose dramatically and the city witnessed a massive influx of immigrants (Breitung, 2009, pp. 108-109) . Increasing cross-border interaction and personal contacts does contribute to growing integration with the Mainland and identification with Mainland China. Yet many Macao people insist on a difference between Mainland Chinese and Macao Chinese, often harbouring rather negative views of Mainland visitors to the city. The border is viewed as necessary to safeguard the special identity of Macao. Therefore increased contacts might also lead to a stronger perception of differences (Breitung, 2009, pp. 121-124) .
In legal terms, Macao was during colonial times treated as an overseas province of of a distinct civic local identity vis-à-vis the PRC, the legal system in Macao has in fact only a low level of social support and legitimacy (Hook & Neves, 2002, p. 132) .
One key reason is the language barrier. The Macao law is copied from the Portuguese law and it was translated into Chinese language only very late in the transition phase.
The Portuguese language is crucial to the understanding of the law and since the quality of translation was not properly controlled, the spirit of the law was not 15 captured accurately. 16 The Macao population knows little about the laws that govern their life and the colonial government had not created information campaigns to make it accessible for the ordinary people (Cabral & Nataf, 1999, p. 21) . The shortage in local Chinese legal experts and trained professionals adds to the fragile state of the legal system. Many of them lack experience or were trained in China and hence are not familiar with the practices in Macao (Hook & Neves, 2002: 132) .
Elite and mass participation
In transforming societies, lawyers and other trained professionals do often act as the vanguard of democratisation or play the role of defenders of civic rights and freedoms.
Yet unlike the neighbouring Hong Kong, the legal community of Macao has not emerged as a strong critic of the government, monitoring the administrations actions.
José Carlos Matias argues that many lawyers come from the rather conservative Portuguese elite and are not well connected to the Chinese community. The conservatism of the elites in general can be attributed to their close attachment to the government and to the pro-PRC businesses to which the private law firms are connected as well. The Macao government is the key player in all aspects of social and economic life of the territory due to the absence of large international companies and organizations. This makes it also difficult for Macanese and Chinese lawyers to openly advocate too daring democratic changes. 17 Although the Macanese community is split in a pro-government faction and one that is more critical towards the administration (Lo, 1999, p. 64) , Carlos Matias argues that its status as a ethnic minority make it naturally dependent on the MSAR government for protection of its unique heritage and cultural projects. Assembly direct and indirect elections. Their absolute loyalty to the CCP is evident in their rhetoric of PRC patriotism and politically conservative outlook (Lo, 1999, p. 63) .
With the growing middle class in the 1980s, new pro-democracy groups have gained popularity among the young and educated population of Macao. Members of these groups were born and bred locally in the 1950s and had a strong sense of belonging to
Macao (Lin, 2006, p. 174 ). Yet the power of the traditional groups has so far been little challenged due to the weakness of the new liberals who lack financial resources, personal networks and organizational mechanisms for political mobilization (Lo, 1999, 66-67) . Conservative networks control the Chinese language media and the main Chinese language paper, the Macao Daily, is strongly pro-MSAR and Beijing government (So & Mok, 1999, 40) . Subjects like critique of the government and democratization are avoided and their pro-China stance is also very evident in their attitude towards the issue of Macao identity. Unlike Hong Kong where the press gives considerable voice to a variety of viewpoints and intellectuals frequently debate questions like a Hong Kong identity, a unique Macao identity is very rarely mentioned. Macao identity is described either in intangible cultural terms (Ji, 2009) or as an issue of personal memory (Shui, 2009 ). The emphasis is put on the national identity as PRC citizens (Hu, 2009) , and even with regard to the UNESCO world heritage sites the Chinese heritage is seen as more important (Wu, 2005) . Assembly includes 12 directly elected members via territory wide lists, 10 members are indirectly law stipulated that Chinese citizens had to reside in the territory for more than five years in order to become eligible to vote. The Portuguese were exempt from this regulation, and since most Chinese were recent immigrants, the Macanese elites and masses dominated politics in these early years (Lo, 1990, p. 148) . After the opening of elections to all Chinese in 1984, the number of registered voters and the voter turnout have continuously risen to well over 50 per cent since the 1990s (Yu, 2007, 428) . The surge in electoral participation can be attributed to electoral mobilization by the government and the public anticipation of the concept of "Macao people ruling
Macao" after the 1999 handover. However, Legislative Assembly elections are traditionally subject to heavy political mobilization 20 behind the scenes which has to be studied more carefully (Lo, 2008, p. 49 (Lo,1999, p. 66) . For the decades prior to the handover, the Group, 2007). The protest was successful and the government promised to reduce the high of the buildings to be constructed (Chung, 2009, pp. 149-153) . This action is of high relevance although the number of participants was rather small; it is directly 19 linked to Macao's identity and the majority of members were Chinese from Macao. (Yee, 2002, pp. 37-39) . Today the vast majority of people already views democracy as the ideal form of government and believe that Macao is ready for full democracy (Yu, 2003b, p. 82) . Young people are especially critical of government policies and are interested in political participation (Yu, 2003a, 29) . Therefore there are signs for a slow rise of a civic identity based on political participation. The deeper understanding of democracy coupled with critique of the MSAR government and demands for 20 political reform would mean that this identity would be in opposition to the traditional PRC Chinese understanding of national identity as a unity of nation, state and CCP.
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At the same time this development however could be circumcised by the rapid integration with the Chinese Mainland, which has already led some scholars to identify a "Mainlandization" of Macao (Yee, 2009) .
Measuring the Macao Identity
The analysis has shown so far that there are indeed strong indicators for a Macao per cent as only "Macao persons" (Aomenren) ( Table 1 ). The birthplace is directly linked to the choice of identity, with the "Macao person" identity only preferred by students born in the city; while the "Chinese person" category is dominated by students born on the Mainland (60 per cent of those who chose that identity).
Interestingly, when opting for a mixed identity category, the Mainland-born students dominantly chose the category that in Chinese language connotes an emphasis on the Macao part of the identity. This study shows that in fact there are more commonalities in terms of identification with the city and attitudes towards democracy between the "Macao Chinese person" and the "Macao person" categories than among the other groups. Therefore combining these two categories into a perceived "pan-Macao identity" is viable and the combined strength of this category was 56 per cent.
Insert Table 1 here
The students were also asked for their thoughts on what icons represent Macao by choosing three items and rank them ( Table 2) Insert Table 2 here
Half of the students felt proud or very proud to be a Macao citizen, with the other half feeling neutral, while 54.3 per cent of students had a strong or very strong sense of belonging to Macao, and 40.7 per cent felt neutral or weak (5 per cent) about belonging to the city. Birthplace and identity make significant differences; those born in Macao had a pan-Macao identity feeling considerably stronger about the city. (Table 3) . Following were questions on pride in the achievements of Macao and the PRC (economic development, history and culture, situation of freedom and democracy, art and literature and international place) ( Table 4 ). The overall results show that the students had more pride in symbols and achievements related to China than to Macao.
Birthplace and identity choice have an impact on their level of pride for China, with
Mainland-born students considerably more proud. Respondents with a Chinese identity choice were less critical of the situation of freedom and democracy in the PRC and Macao.
Insert Table 3 Identification with the modern Chinese state was high, but students with a Macao identity seemed to be less willing to commit to PRC symbols. These patterns can also be observed in the students' responses towards the achievements of Macao and the PRC (Table 4) Insert Table 4 here
Most of the Macao students state that they were interested in public affairs (74.4
per cent) and follow the news regularly (49.1 per cent). Students with a Chinese identity but were born in Macau were more interested in politics and followed the news more regularly; this however did not translate into different patterns of political participation. All students believe that voting and participating in demonstrations are the most meaningful ways of participation (64.4 per cent and 50.8 per cent respectively). Protest letters and signature campaigns are not viewed as effective, with 71.2 per cent chose neutral or not meaningful (Table 5 ).
Insert Table 5 here My pilot study shows that, in terms of interest in public affairs and political participation, there are positive signs for a developing civic identity among students.
The fact that the majority of students chose the more active ways of political participation (voting and demonstrations) over signing protests letters or joining signature campaigns shows that they are willing to get involved in Macao's public affairs. The high percentage rate of students who believed that protests are meaningful, and the fact that a third of the respondents had reservations over the effectiveness of voting in elections, can be interpreted as follows: students have high demands on the Simultaneously, however, the economic development could lead youngsters to join the casino industry instead of studying (Lo, 2009, p. 34) 
